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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2017, the Technology and Construction Court in London
("TCC") used a duty of care analysis to dismiss Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell
Plc' for lack of jurisdiction; exemplifying a trend in which British courts
favor a duty of care analyses over clear jurisdictional analyses to find
jurisdiction.2 Small communities in the Nigeria's Niger Delta brought an
action against Royal Dutch Shell PLC ("RDS") and Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria ("SPDC"), a subsidiary of RDS, based in
Lagos, Nigeria.3 The communities sought compensation for the oil spills
that caused extreme environmental damage, loss of livelihoods and income,
and the absence of clean drinking water.4 The plaintiff represents members
of the Bille and Ogale communities, who experienced a decline in their
livelihoods as farmers and fishermen because major bodies of water have
been contaminated by crude oil.' The court ruled that because the parent
company, RDS, did not have proper jurisdiction in the English courts, the
1. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89 (Eng.).
2. See id. [ 122].
3. See id. [2]-[4]; ("[Between 'the Billie claims' and 'the Ogale claims"'); Holly
Ellyatt, Shell Faces Further Suit Over Nigeria Oil Spills, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:03
A.M.), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/02/shell-faces-further-suit-over-nigeria-oil-spills.
html (describing the lawsuit brought by the Bille and Ogale communities against Shell's
Nigerian subsidiary for harmful effects resulting in pollution of farmland and water); see
generally Niger River, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Niger-River (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (describing the Niger River's physiology,
including the Niger Delta).
4. See Ellyatt, supra note 2 (reporting that the residents of the Bille and Ogale
communities say they have not had clean drinking water since 1989 because of oil spills).
5. See id.; see also AMNESTY INT'L, NIGERIA: PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND
POVERTY IN THE NIGER DELTA 27 (Amnesty International Publications 2009), http:/
/www.anmestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr440172009en.pdf [hereinafter PETROLEUM,
POLLUTION AND POVERTY] (summarizing women have reported that the shellfish in the
mangroves that they rely on for sale and food, and which are easily destroyed by pollution
due to their sedentary nature, are disappearing because of oil pollution).
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subsidiary, SPDC, was therefore also not subject to the TCC jurisdiction.6
The judge asserted a duty of care analysis to find that the plaintiffs could not
prove that (1) the harm was foreseeable to RDS, (2) the two defendants were
not in close operational proximity to each other, and (3) it would be
unreasonable, unfair, and unjust to subject RDS to jurisdiction in England.'
The plaintiff s appealed the decision and contended that the judge's reading
of the facts was too narrow.'
This Comment argues that on appeal, the TCC should reverse the lower
court for failing to find jurisdiction through a duty of care analysis and,
instead, find jurisdiction through a specific personal jurisdiction, derived
from American jurisprudence. Specific personal jurisdiction would allow
the plaintiff to present facts that highlight the contacts and relationships
shared between RDS, SPDC, and the English forum. Part II provides a
comprehensive background on the nature and importance of oil and gas
operations in Nigeria and gives a brief primer on case similar to Okpabi.
These cases highlight the problems with a duty of care analysis and illustrate
the need for consistency in jurisdictional rulings. Part II further explains
how the United States Supreme Court has found jurisdiction over foreign,
corporate defendants. Part III argues that the TCC should consider
reexamining Okpabi solely through a personal jurisdiction analysis, as
opposed to a duty of care analysis, to determine TCC jurisdiction. Part IV
recommends that the Nigerian legislature create long arm statutes to govern
oil and gas disputes and utilize special subject-matter jurisdiction courts.
Finally, this Comment concludes that U.S. personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence is valuable because it (1) promotes reliance on unique facts;
(2) encourages specific personal jurisdiction; and (3) enhances stability and
reliability in foreign corporation disputes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ENERGY USE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NIGERIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Early Beginnings ofEnergy Resources in Nigeria
Nigeria has abundant primary energy resources, such as crude oil and
natural gas, coal, and tar sands, as well as renewable energy resources such
6. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [122] (holding that no duty of care was
owed by the Shell Group and, therefore, not by RDS).
7. Id. [113]-[15],[22].
8. Lucas Roorda, Okpabi v. Shell: A Setback For Business and Human Rights?,
UTRECHT CTR. ACCOUNTABILITY & LIABILITY L. (Feb. 13, 2017), http://blog.ucall.nl/in
dex.php/2017/02/okpabi-v-shell-a-setback-for-business-and-human-rights/(explaining
that the defendants appealed "both on jurisdictional and on substantive issues").
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as water, fuelwood, solar, wind, and biomass.9 The Niger Delta, located in
the southernmost part of Nigeria, "is among Africa's most densely populated
regions, as well as among the world's ten most important wetlands."'o The
Niger Delta is also the location of the crude oil reserves, which are
predominantly found in small fields in the coastal areas." Nigerian oil is
classified as "light" and "sweet," a quality that makes it particularly sought
after because it is less expensive to refine and transport.2
Since the late 1960s, the Nigerian economy has been primarily dependent
on oil exploitation to meet its development, energy, and power needs.3
Nigeria began producing oil in 1958, after RDS discovered crude oil in the
Niger Delta in 1956.14 Since 1937, however, when Nigeria granted Shell
D'Arcy (SPDC's predecessor) oil exploration rights, RDS has effectively
grown and maintained a monopoly over the oil and gas industry in the
country.'5 Today, the "oil and gas sector represents 97 percent of Nigeria's
foreign exchange revenues and contributes 79.5 percent of government
revenues."16
B. Shell and Nigeria: A Tumultuous History
SPDC is the Nigerian subsidiary of RDS and is the largest onshore
9. See ENERGY COMM'N OF NIGERIA, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 10-34 (2003),
http://www.ecowrex.org/system/files/repository/2003_nationalenergy policy.pdf
10. See Barisere Rachel Konne, Note, Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement in
the Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case ofShell and Ogoniland, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 18 1,
181-82 (2014); PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note 5, at 9; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 7 (1999), https://ww
w.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0 1 99.pdf (noting that "[t]he Niger Delta is one of
the world's largest wetlands, and the largest in Africa [as it] encompasses over 20,000
square kilometers.").
11. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 25 (statinging that 1997 estimates
of Nigeria's oil reserves were between 16 billion and 22 billion barrels, from 159 oil
fields and 1,481 wells).
12. See id. at 25, 59 (defining "sweet oil" as oil with a low sulphur content and "light
oil" as oil with low density that flows freely at room temperature).
13. See Konne, supra note 9, at 182 (stating that Nigeria began producing oil in 1958,
and has since become the largest oil producer in Africa); see also ENERGY COMM'N OF
NIGERIA, supra note 8, at 10 ("The nation is clearly over dependent on crude oil for its
foreign exchange, hence the economy is vulnerable to the unstable nature of the
international oil market.").
14. See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note 4, at 11.
15. See Konne, supra note 9, at 182 ("Nigeria has become Africa's largest oil
producer, with an estimated 37.2 billion barrels of oil reserves as of January 2013."); see
also ENERGY COMM'N OF NIGERIA, supra note 8, at 10 (stating that it would be beneficial
for the country to diversify their energy mix in order to avoid conflict).
16. PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note 5, at 11.
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producer of crude oil in the Nigera." SPDC's operations are primarily
conducted in the Niger Delta, with much of the infrastructure located near
local communities' homes, farms, and water sources." The first
commercially producing oil field was discovered in Oloibiri, Bayelsa State
in 1956 and RDS commenced drilling.' 9 Since that time, additional high
producing oil fields have been discovered in the Niger Delta area, leading to
the creation of, for example, the Bonny, Forcados, and Qua Ibo wells.20 After
discovering these new fields, SPDC's production capacity increased
dramatically, and now has "over 6,000 kilometers of pipelines, 87 flow
stations, eight gas plants, and more than 1,000 producing oil wells," making
SPDC the largest private-sector oil and gas company in Nigeria.2 '
SPDC is also party to the largestjoint oil venture in Nigeria, covering over
31, 000 square kilometers of land and producing an estimated forty percent
of Nigeria's crude oil output.2 2 SPDC currently produces over 200,000
barrels of oil a day through its joint venture agreement with the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation ("NNPC"), 23 National Agip Oil Company
Limited ("NAOC"), 24 and Total Petroleum Nigeria Limited ("TPNL"). 25
Through this collaboration, SPDC discovered more oil fields and natural gas
17. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 27-28 (noting that SPDC,
originally Shell D'Arcy, was the first company to obtain rights to Nigerian oil).
18 Id.at 62-64 (describing the effects of the infrastructure on the land and livelihood
of the local communities).
19. See Kairn A. Klieman, US. Oil Companies, the Nigerian Civil War, and the
Origins ofOpacity in the Nigerian Oil Industry, 99 J. AM. HIST. 155, 157 (2012); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 25; see also William Wallis & Anjli Raval,
Shell Proves Test Case for Oil Majors' Environmental Records, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.ft.com/content/90b2a612-dfc4-1 e5-b072-006d8d362ba3.
20. David Thomas, Niger Delta Oil Production Reserves, Field Sizes Assessed, OIL
& GAS J., Nov. 13, 1995, https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-93/issue-46/in-
this-issue/exploration/niger-delta-oil-production-reserves-field-sizes-assessed.html.
21. Konne, supra note 10, at 182; PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note
5, at 88 n.27; see also WHO WE ARE, SHELL NIGERIA, http://www.shell.com.ng/abou
tshell/who-we-are.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
22. See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note 5, at 11-12; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA, THE OGONI CRISIS: A CASE-STUDY OF MILITARY REPRESSION
IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA 7 (1995), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Nigeria.htm
[hereinafter THE OGONI CRISIS]; Wallis & Raval, supra note 19.
23. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that SPDC is the
operator of a joint venture between NNPC and two other corporations, and that SPDC
accounts for 30% of that venture and NNPC accounts for 55%).
24. See id. at 29 (explaining that NAOCA a small joint venture run by Agip, NNPC,
and Phillips Petroleum and stating that NAOC produces oil mainly from small, onshore
fields).
25. See generally WHO WE ARE, supra note 21 (emphasizing that Total E&P has a
10% stake in the joint venture).
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reserves.26 As of September 2017, Nigeria is among the top ten largest crude
oil producers in the world.27
C. The Slippery Slope of Oil Activities
The integrated system of oil and gas production has not translated into
economic prosperity and social growth for many in the Niger Delta region
because the oil operations caused severe environmental degradation to the
fragile biodiverse region.28  The Niger Delta suffers from a series of
problems: the area has poor infrastructure, some members of its communities
live on less than one dollar per day, SPDC's local employees face rampant
discrimination, access to clean drinking water is poor as a result of oil spills,
and many citizens suffer from health issues as a result of the pollution and
gas flaring.29 Furthermore, the environmental damage has led to the
degradation of the health and livelihood of the Ogoni people, whose
homeland is in the Niger Delta.30 These social, environmental, and health
issues are evidence of the oil and gas industry's devastating impact on the
Niger Delta.
D. A Spud-In at Local Cases in International Places: How the TCC
Decided Okpabi v. SPDC
Alleging negligence and seeking redress for the lack of clean water
sources in Ogoniland, plaintiffs from the Bille and Ogale communities sued
26. See id.
27. Anjli Raval, Nigeria To Resist Cuts To Its Oil Output, Minister Says, FIN. TIMES
fig.1 (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/09e6c764-979a-l 1e7-a652-cde3f882
dd7b.
28. See generally W. Corbett Dabbs, Oil Production and Environmental Damage,
ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY (Dec. 1996), http://environment-ecology.com/environ
ment-writings/759-oil-production-and-environmental-damage.html (describing how
some countries do not benefit from oil production because of the detrimental
environmental impact of oil production on the country's environment).
29. See THE OGONI CRISIS, supra note 22 (explaining that the Oil Mineral Producing
Areas Development Commission was established in 1992 to address the oil and gas
industry's damage to the region); PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY, supra note 54,
at 18 (defining gas flaring as the burning of the "associated gas" produced when oil is
pumped from the ground); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 85-86
(stating that Niger Delta populations remain poor and without access to clean water).
30. See THE OGONI CRISIS, supra note 22; PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY,
supra note 4, at 4 (noting that SPDC withdrew from Ogoniland in 1993 during local
protests and military activity, has never been able to resume operations in that area);
Elena Keates, After Decades of Death and Destruction, Shell Pays Just $83 Million for
Recent Oil Spills, GREENPEACE (Jan. 11, 2015 https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/shell-oil-
settlement-ogoniland/ (explaining that Shell's equipment is still in Ogoniland despite not
having operated there since 1993).
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both RDS and SPDC in the TCC.3 ' Typically, when suing a corporation,
plaintiffs must sue where the corporation is incorporated.32 Therefore, the
plaintiffs chose forum in England, where RDS is incorporated.3 3 in January
2017, the Okpabi court found for the defendants in the preliminary
jurisdiction hearing.34 It held that the parent company, RDS, was not subject
to jurisdiction in England because there was no duty of care imposed on RDS
through its associations with its subsidiary, SPDC.35 The court applied the
three-pronged duty of care analysis: (1) foreseeability, (2) proximity, and
(3) reasonability.36 It concluded that all three prongs were absent and, thus,
RDS owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs or to SPDC.3 7 To discuss the
foreseeability and proximity requirements,3 8 the court cited Caparo v.
Dickman39 which originally put forth the three-part foreseeability test used
to determine whether there is sufficient proximity between a parent and its
subsidiary for a duty of care to attach. In Chandler v. Cape Plc,4 0 the court
reinforced and elaborated on the foreseeability test, asking whether (1) the
parent and subsidiaries operate the same businesses; (2) the parent has, or
should have, relevant superior or special knowledge compared to the
subsidiary; (3) the parent had, or should have had, knowledge of the
subsidiary's systems of work; and (4) the parent knew, or should have
foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on the parent using
its superior knowledge to protect the claimants. 41 Donoghue v. Stevenson42
demonstrated that companies "must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions" that are reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to those so closely
and directly affected by the corporation's actions.43 Where a duty of care is
found to have been present for the parent company, it may also extend to
31. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc, [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [2]-[3] (Eng.).
32. See, e.g., When will the English Courts Have Jurisdiction over a Dispute?,
STEPHENSON HARDWOOD (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.shlegal.com/news-insights/when-
will-the-english-courts-have-jurisdiction-over-a-dispute.
33. Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [4].
34. Id. [13], [122] (stating the case was heard from November 22 to November 24,




38. Id. [72] (promulgating that courts must apply the three-part test of foreseeability,
proximity, and reasonableness to find a duty of care).
39. Caparo Indus. Plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 633 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
40. Chandler v. Cape, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (Eng.).
41. Id. [80]; see also Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [77].
42. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 580 (appeal taken from Scot.).
43. Id. at 580.
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employees of the subsidiary.4 4 For the reasonability requirement, a duty is
assessed by weighing the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk,
and the public interest in the proposed solution.45 In applying Donoghue and
Caparo, the TCC decided that (1) the harm was not foreseeable to RDS, (2)
RDS, as the parent corporation, did not have superior knowledge over SPDC,
and (3) it was unreasonable to subject RDS to English jurisdiction because
it would not be just, fair, or reasonable.46
E. Opening a Vee-Door for Success: How the U.S. Decides
Jurisdictional Questions
Jurisdictional cases are more successful in U.S. courts which offer a
suitable template for approaching and rectifying the jurisdictional problems
in cases like Okpabi.47 International Shoe v. Washington,48 Daimler AG v.
Bauman,49 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Calfornia so
illustrate the two main theories in U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence: the
minimum contacts test and the stream of commerce tests." A foundational
case in U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence is International Shoe, in which the
petitioner was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Missouri, and the respondent was the state of Washington who wished to
collect on allegedly delinquent state unemployment fees.52 The petitioner
argued that it was improperly served due to a lack ofjurisdictional authority
over the petitioner because it (1) had no registered agents in the state, (2) was
not an employer in the state, and (3) was not a corporation doing business in
44. Thompson v. Renwick Grp. plc [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [37] (Eng.); see also
Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80].
45. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80].
46. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [113], [118]-[19]
(Eng.).
47. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (holding
that " [ilurisdiction is proper... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the
defendant himselfthat create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State.");
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (summarizing that minimum contacts must
have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (stating
that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with that State.").
48. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
50. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
51. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 750-51; Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 105-06;
Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313.
52. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
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Washington and, therefore, the Supreme Court should set aside the
respondent's notice.53 However, the Court ruled that the corporation was
properly served and subject to personal jurisdiction because it maintained
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state, therefore making it
reasonable for the corporation to defend a lawsuit in Washington.54 This
standard, known as the "minimum contacts test," instructs that "contacts or
ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the
state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there."
Similarly, in Perkins v. Benguet,56 a nonresident of Ohio state sued a
company based in the Philippines.5 ' Here, the Court decided that because
Benguet had maintained a "continuous and systematic, but limited, part of
its general business [in the forum state, Ohio]" by paying salaries,
maintaining bank accounts and business correspondence, and conducting
directors' meetings in Ohio, it was fair to subject the foreign company to the
Ohio courts.
Furthermore, in Daimler, Argentinian respondents sued a California
company, alleging that the company's subsidiary committed human rights
violations in Argentina.59 The petitioner was a German company, but the
respondents based their claim on the petitioner's subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC ("MBUSA"), which was incorporated in Delaware and had its
principal place of business in New Jersey.60  The respondents based
jurisdiction on the fact that MBUSA distributed the petitioner's cars to
California and had various facilities and offices in California. 61 However,
the petitioner argued that the alleged acts took place outside of California
53. Id. at 312-13.
54. Id. at 316, 321; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)
("However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not
be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.").
55. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320; Edmond R. Anderson Jr., Personal Jurisdiction Over
Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. REV. 336, 345 (1963) ("[The minimum contacts test is] a flexible
standard governing state courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, i.e., contacts or ties with the state making it reasonable and just according
to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.").
56. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 439 (1952).
57. See id. at 439 (reporting that the primary reason for suit was to compel the
corporation to issue stock certificated and dividends).
58. Id. at 445; Anderson, supra note 56, at 346.
59. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-51 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 752.
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and the U.S. so there was no basis for personal jurisdiction.62 The Court held
that the petitioner corporation's contacts with California were minimal and
not continuous or systematic, thereby not subjecting it to personal
jurisdiction because the corporation's conduct did not occur in or impact the
state.63
Lastly, in Asahi, a California resident brought a products liability claim
against a Japanese corporation.64 The respondent relied on a stream of
commerce argument to justify jurisdiction in California because the
petitioner allegedly knew that some of its products would end up in
California.65 Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that although the
petitioner may have known that its product might end up in California, the
petitioner took no further action to "purposely avail itself of the California
market" evidenced by its lack of agents, property, employees, or offices in
the forum state.66 In deciding Asahi, the Court, attempting to clarify the
stream of commerce standard for determining whether "minimum contacts"
has been established, announced two competing tests:
Justice O'Connor's stream of commerce plus test [which] require[s]
'additional purposeful actions directed at the forum besides simply putting
a product in the stream of commerce with knowledge that the product
would be sold in the forum state[,]' . . . [and] Justice Brennan['s] . . . pure
stream of commerce test, which require[s] no showing of additional
conduct . . . 'to sustain jurisdiction in the forum where that product causes
injury.'67
Overall, the specific personal jurisdiction cases in the U.S. creates a
consistent narrative. The tests identify a level of contact between the parties
which, in turn, determines whether a case may be heard in a given forum,
prior to any determination of a duty.68 Likewise, each test must be applied
62. Id. at 751.
63. Id. at 761-62.
64. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1987).
65. Id. at 112.
66. Id. at 103, 112; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 929 (2011) (reasoning that the three subsidiaries' connections with North
Carolina were not continuous and systematic and, thus, the stream of commerce
argument was unsuccessful because the respondents were unable to show that the
petitioner purposely availed itself of the state).
67. Kaitlyn Findley, Comment, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream Of Commerce
Doctrine: Interpreting Justice Breyer's Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts
to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional Standards, 63 EMoRY L.J. 695, 710-712 (2014)
(explaining that the two tests were each supported by four justices).
68. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 108-09 (stating the rule for establishing
whether or not a court has jurisdiction to hear a case).
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to the specific facts of each case.69
F. The Jurisdiction Question: Determination, Purpose, and Utility
Proper adjudication requires that all issues pertinent to the merits of a suit
be raised and answered at the beginning stages of litigation.70 The goal of
addressing jurisdiction is to ensure that the case is brought in the appropriate
forum and to guarantee that the court has the proper authority to hear the
case.7 ' Another goal is efficiency; it would be counterproductive to the
judicial process to fully try a case on the merits and then move for objections
to venue or demurrers.72 Frequently, duty of care frameworks, rather than
specific personal jurisdiction analyses, are used to ascertain adjudicatory
authority in oil and gas lawsuits against foreign companies.73 However, this
method of deriving adjudicatory authority in foreign courts over Nigerian oil
and gas disputes has resulted in inconsistent rulings and the unavailability of
effective precedent.74
III. THE IMPACT OF INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN ADDRESSING JURISDICTION
QUESTIONS IN NIGERIA
Due to inconsistent applications of the duty of care analysis, preliminary
jurisdiction hearings for Nigerian oil and gas cases fail to balance business
interests and human rights.
69. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (discussing
that the amount and type of activities necessary to exercise specific personal jurisdiction
are determined by the facts of each case).
70. See Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [13] (Eng.) ("It
is obviously sensible, and entirely conventional, to have challenges to jurisdiction dealt
with at the beginning of any action. . .. "); Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491,
491 (1967).
71. Dobbs, supra note 70, at 491.
72. See, e.k., Okolo v. Union Bank Ltd. [20041 3 NWLR 87, 110 (Nigeria) (ruling
that when the court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matter before it, the proper order is to strike out the action so that the court would not
carry out an exercise in futility and end up having its proceedings and outcomes
amounting to nothing); see, e.g., Pre-Trial Motions, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/u
sao/justice-101/pretrial-motions (last visited Mar. 31, 2018) (suggesting that other lines
of defense are motions to suppress and motions to dismiss).
73. Nicola Jdigers et al., The Future of Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial
Human Rights Abuses: The Dutch Case Against Shell, 107 AJIL UNBOUND 36, 38-39
(2014), https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1577353/JagersetalAJILUnbound_2014.pdf
(describing the Palestinian Doctor case).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 39-40 (noting that prior cases relied on the parent company-subsidiary
company liability theory under corporate governance).
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A. Using the American Specific Personal Jurisdiction Principles:
How Should the Okpabi Appeal be Tailored?
To secure the consistency of jurisdiction jurisprudence, the court should
reverse the Okpabi decision because the TCC improperly relied on a duty of
care analysis as a form of ascertaining jurisdiction.76 The current approach
leads to "an inquiry into what part the defendant played in controlling the
operations of the group, what its directors and employees knew or ought to
have known, and what action was taken and not taken."7 7  Instead, the
analysis should be limited to the substantial connections and relations that
create links between the parties and the forum.8 If U.S. standards are
applied, Okpabi should be permitted access to the English court.79
i. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Answers the Question of
Foreseeability
The Okpabi court discussed whether it was foreseeable that, from the
parent company's point of view, the parent could be held liable for the acts
of the subsidiary.so In doing so, the TCC focused on the defendant's
knowledge, actions, and role in business operations."" Thus, the TCC
concluded that (1) there was no evidence that RDS was involved in any oil
operations in Nigeria, so it was not better placed than the subsidiary to
prevent harm from occurring, and (2) the degree of knowledge that RDS had
over SPDC was not comprehensive or high enough for a duty of care to
attach.8 2
76. See Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. Plc [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975, [62] (Eng.)
(warning that the "court should not embark on a mini-trial" in deciding on a preliminary
jurisdiction hearing); Roorda, supra note 8 (explaining that the problem with a duty of
care analysis for jurisdiction disputes is that it often requires the trier of fact to evaluate
the merits of the case).
77. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [74] (Eng.) (quoting
Lubbe v. Cape Plc [2000] UKHL 41 [20] (appeal taken from Eng.)).
78. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
79. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48; Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 321; Texas Trading
& Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d. Cir. 1980) (listing the inquiries
necessary to determine whether the party meets the minimum contacts necessary to fall
under the court's jurisdiction).
80. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [70]-[80] (Eng.).
81. Id. [74].
82. See id. [86], [116]-[17]; see also Roorda, supra note 8 (emphasizing that the
while the plaintiffs focused on the interaction of RDS' policies that influence SPDC
operations, the TCC focused on the "particular working relationship between RDS and
its subsidiary, SPDC" and ruled that RDS' involvement with SPDC is minimal at best
and, thus, RDS could not have prevented the harms from occurring).
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However, the foreseeability requirement can instead be articulated
through a specific personal jurisdiction argument by using the minimum
contacts test derived from International Shoe.83 The main inquiry in the
minimum contacts test is whether the interaction between the corporation or
its agents and the forum state is systematic and regular.84 While business
operations are not necessarily the focus for the minimum contacts inquiry,
the focus should be the "presence of activities that occur within the state that
are sufficient to satisfy due process."" In this context, RDS is liable for
SPDC if: (1) it intervenes in trading operations as it relates to production
and funding issues,86 (2) RDS deals with financial matters, such as holding
shares directly in SPDC, disseminating financial statements and updating
investors with SPDC's information, all of which are "normal incidents" of a
parent and subsidiary relationship," and (3) RDS has some degree of
knowledge about how SPDC functions over the continuous years since 2005
that it has served as the parent company."
Under a U.S. personal jurisdiction regime, RDS would be subject to suit
in England as it is incorporated there and the choice of location poses no
measure of inconvenience for RDS.8 9 Incidentally, this could be beneficial
to SPDC because the TCC and the parties' lawyers have already
"accumulated a body of experience and knowledge in this jurisdiction" from
prior cases such as Bodo v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria90
83. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
84. Id. at 317.
85. Id. at 316-17 (clarifying that "present" or "presence" symbolizes the corporate
agent's activities within the state that courts will deem sufficient to satisfy the demands
of due process and that those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the forum state as makes it reasonable to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit in said form); see also Roorda, supra note 8.
86. See Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [80] (Eng.); Okpabi v. Royal
Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [76] (Eng.) (satisfying one of the requirements
reiterated in the Chandler test).
87. Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [75], [85] (summarizing that the Chandler
court's assertion that it can be difficult to ascertain what is normal incident in a parent-
subsidiary relationship because the manner in which groups of companies operated is
often very different, and it is possible that a subsidiary is run "purely as a division of a
parent company," even though they still maintain a separate legal personality).
88. Id. [85], [116] (demonstrating that minimum contacts looks to the cumulative
and continuous contacts between both parties and the forum for the years in dispute).
89. See Shyam Shanker, Okpabi v. Shell: Limitink English Jurisdiction Over
Human-Rights Abuses Abroad, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.: THE BULLETIN, http://jtl.
columbia.edu/okpabi-v-shell-limiting-english-jurisdiction-over-human-rights-abuses-
abroad/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2018) (explaining that Justice Fraser conceded that England
had jurisdiction over RDS because the company's domicile is in England).
90. Bodo v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria [2014] EWHC (TCC) 2170 (Eng.).
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and Lungowe v. Resources Plc.9 1 Therefore, by applying the minimum
contacts principle, SPDC and RDS have maintained minimum contacts,
thereby making SPDC amenable to suit in England.92 Finally, doing so will
not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
ii. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Rectifies the Question ofProximity
As RDS is already domiciled in England, there was no issue of proximity
to the forum for RDS. However, for SPDC, the court's jurisdictional inquiry
focused on SPDC's relationship with its parent company, RDS.9 4  To
determine whether the proximity requirement was met, the court examined:
(1) whether the party that committed the act and the person bound to take
care of that person are closely related, and (2) who is better placed because
of superior knowledge or expertise that they could have prevented the risk
of injury.95 Taking these into account, the court found that RDS is ultimately
a holding company because it has no employees, does not participate in any
operations or provide any services, and oes not involve itself or intervene
in its subsidiaries' operations.96 The court's decision was based on a variety
of legal technicalities to further distance the relationship between RDS and
SPDC; thereby weakening the chain of liability between the claimants and
the forum.97
Nevertheless, using a specific personal jurisdiction argument, the principle
91. Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. Plc [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 (Eng.); see Int'l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 317; Okpabi [20171 EWHC (TCC) 89, [42] (defining this idea as the
Cambridgeshire factor); Shanker, supra note 89.
92. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321 (ruling that because International Shoe Co. made
"itself amenable to suit upon obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in
Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam to collect the tax laid
upon the exercise of the privilege of employing appellant's salesmen within the state.");
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming
that necessary contacts must exist before courts can exercise specific personal
jurisdiction and the exercise must embody the Constitutional requirements of due
process); Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [42].
93. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
94. See Shanker, supra note 89 (noting that the Court focused so narrowly on the
operational relationship between RDS and SPDC and that many factors played a role in
the court's ruling that RDS had no duty of care over its subsidiary's actions).
95. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 581 (appeal taken from Scot.);
Thompson v. Renwick Grp. plc [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [37] (Eng.).
96. Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85].
97. Roorda, supra note 8 (asserting that it is now clear that "bringing claims against
parent companies for misconduct of their subsidiaries is fraught with difficulties, even
though it may be hypothetically possible," especially now that the court in Okpabi court
is conservatively approaching the emerging trend of transnational private liability of
corporations for human rights violations).
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of continuous and systematic affiliations derived from Perkins and Daimler
counters the proximity issue.98 Similarly, the stream of commerce concepts
from Asahi serve to illuminate the other contacts and responsibilities that
could be made an ingredient of the TCC's jurisdictional analysis, as opposed
to the TCC's analysis of RDS' control (or lack thereof) of SPDC's
potentially exist outside of the business and operational affairs in Okpabi.99
The stream of commerce principle derived from Asahi can be used to
extend jurisdiction to SPDC.'00 RDS, as the ultimate holding company of
the Shell Group companies, is (1) responsible for setting the overall strategy
and business principles for SPDC, (2) responsible for performance reports
from SPDC, and (3) in charge of making the necessary market and investor
disclosures.'0 ' These limited, but continuous and systematic relationships
bind SPDC to RDS, and, thereby, jurisdiction should be extended to the
TCC.' 02 Most importantly, RDS is responsible for changing and amending
the corporate structure of its relationship with SPDC and, therefore, even on
paper, RDS is automatically better positioned to understand and foresee any
risk of injury because of its superior knowledge of and relationship with
SPDC.'03 Thus, due to the nature of this relationship, it is fair to infer that
the subsidiary will "rely upon the parent deploying its superior knowledge
98. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2014); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
99. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [72]-[74] (quoting Lubbe v Cape Plc
[2000] UKHL 41, [6]) (discussing whether the parent company "exercised de facto
control over the [business] operations of a (foreign) subsidiary and knew, through its
directors, that those operations involved risks to the health of workers and persons in the
vicinity of the factory"); id. [4] (describing SPDC as an "exploration and [oil] production
company"); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (ruling
that, to place a product in the stream of commerce without any further action, does not
show that the defendant purposefully directed itself towards the forum).
100. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011) (deciding that North Carolina
was not a sufficient forum to subject the petitioners to because they were in no way
declared at home in the state and their connection fell very short of "' the continuous and
systematic general business contacts' [that are] necessary to empower North Carolina to
entertain suit against them on claims that unrelated to anything that connects them to the
State.").
101. Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85], [101] (attesting that from an
organizational structure, "RDS does exercise significant control over the financial,
business and operation affairs of the subsidiaries through the RDS Executive
Committee," but dismissing this as an irrelevant consideration to proximity and focusing,
instead, solely on the business and operational affairs of the relationship).
102. See, e.g., Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 447-48 (describing a company that devoted
personal attention to policy making and dispatching funds for the company during
wartime as sufficiently limited activities which were continuous for a period of time).
103. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [77], [106] (quoting Thompson v. Renwick
Grp. Plc [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [37] (Eng.)).
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in order to protect its employees from risk of injury." 0 4 If the entire concept
of a holding company is a company that oversees the policies and
management of a company it holds shares in, it then follows that the holding
company must understand how the subsidiary operates to reap its benefits.'o
Therefore, although RDS does not interfere with SPDC's operations,
SPDC's business and financial interactions with RDS can tie SPDC to the
TCC. 106
Unlike the defendants in Asahi who did not purposefully avail themselves
of the forum state, here, the stream of commerce test is satisfied because
SPDC purposely availed itself of the English forum through its relationship
with RDS.0 7 Additionally, by failing to adequately operate the Nigerian
subsidiary's assets, RDS can also be held liable for the claims brought by the
plaintiffs.0 s Thus, because SPDC availed itself of the English forum vis-a-
vis its connections with RDS, it is reasonable that the court should find that
the defendants can be heard before the TCC and, therefore, provide an
avenue for the plaintiffs to seek redress.109 Furthermore, the proximity
requirement is better addressed using the personal jurisdiction stream of
commerce principle because the totality of the interactions between both
defendants are not limited solely to operational activities, but also include
the financial and business relationships.' 0
Furthermore, using the continuous and systematic rationale derived from
Daimler and Perkins, the existence of the relationship between RDS and
SPDC for almost twelve years gives rise to continuous and systematic
104. Id.; see generally Parent Company, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/terms/p/parentcompany.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2018) (noting that the nature of
holding companies is such that they are generally in the same industry or a
complimentary industry).
105. See Holding Company, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h
/holdingcompany.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2018) (holding companies must still
"understand how their subsidiaries operate to evaluate the businesses' performance and
prospects on an ongoing basis").
106. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85] (detailing the operational extent of
the relationship between RDS and SPDC).
107. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); Okpabi
[2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85].
108. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [72] (emphasizing that by looking at the
range of factual matters, the court can conclude that there is a claim against the parent
company).
109. But see Roorda, supra note 8 (speculating that if Okpabi is decided on appeal
similarly, then the "courts of parent companies' home states [may] become inaccessible
for victims of extraterritorial human rights violations.").
110. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85]; Roorda, supra note 8 (noting that the
TCC based a better part of the judgement on the particular working and operational
relationship between RDS and SPDC).
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affiliations."' To the extent that RDS benefits or gains interests from its
investments in SPDC's operations, it is enough to link SPDC to RDS, which
then subjects SPDC to the TCC's jurisdiction." 2 Accordingly, on appeal,
both defendants can be hauled into court in England because SPDC's fiscal
activities, business practices, and expertise derive authority from RDS, who
is incorporated in the contested forum (England)."3
The continuous and systematic analysis derived from Daimler and Perkins
also invalidates the argument that RDS is not in an authoritative position
over SPDC.114  It is good public policy for courts to encourage and
subsequently permit extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporations that may
not otherwise take responsibility for the operations and actions of their
subsidiaries."' Thus, the plaintiffs were correct in arguing that RDS had
superior knowledge of it subsidiary's environmental policies and because of
its role as the parent company, "RDS was better placed to prevent harms to
others better than SPDC itself, and should have taken certain actions to
[both] avoid..." and rectify the harms."6
Overall, the court did not appropriately consider RDS' and SPDC's
financial and business ties." 7 Therefore, by basing its decision on various
legal technicalities, the court separated the r lationship between RDS and
111. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
112. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [85] (providing that RDS was not the
holding company until 2005 and it was just a shell company prior to that time); see, e.g.,
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (reiterating
that the inquiry into exercising specific personal jurisdiction with single or occasional
acts is whether there was some activity that the corporation purposefully availed itself of
within the forum state that invoked the benefits and protections of its laws).
113. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758_(upholding that general jurisdiction now occupies
a less dominant place in jurisdictional inquiries because specific personal jurisdiction
increasingly focuses the inquiry on the relationship between the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation claim).
114. See id.; see also Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445; Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89,
[106].
115. See generally Shanker, supra note 89 (explaining that the Okpabi decision can
be read as highly fact-specific inquiry that presents hurdles for potential future suits in
English courts, particularly with respect to holding parent companies liable for the
actions of the foreign subsidiary).
116. See also Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [87]; Roorda, supra note 8; June
Rudderdam, Canada: Understanding Holding Companies, MONDAQ (July 28, 2011),
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/134060/Directors+Officers+Executives+
Shareholders/Understanding+Holding+Companies (describing that harm does not
necessarily have to be material or tangible but can also be reflected as the loss of a
compnay's good will).
117. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [88] (finding that "what the defendants
said in their evidence should not necessarily be taken at face value" because RDS may
not operate its business in the way it demonstrated on paper).
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SPDC, which further attenuated the relationship between the defendants and
the forum."'
iii. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Balances the Question of
Reasonableness
The Okpabi court used the "three-fold test" to determine whether the
imposition of a duty upon the defendants would be "fair, just and
reasonable," and, thus, whether it is appropriate to haul the defendants into
court in England."9 In Goldberg, the court noted that a duty exists when you
weigh "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public
interest in the proposed solution."'20 Similarly, the court in McLoughlin
listed "[s]pace, time, distance, the nature of the injuries sustained, and the
relationship of the plaintiff to the immediate victim of the accident" when
applying the reasonably foreseeable test.'2 ' However, the Okpabi court
failed to adequately balance these general fairness interests.'2 2 The Okpabi
ruling created a toxic precedent which provides parents companies an
incentive to remain detached from the operations of their subsidiaries to
lower their chances of being held liable alongside the subsidiary.'2 3
Within the U.S. framework, reasonableness is demonstrated in terms of
due process rights.2 4 Applying similar principles on appeal, the court should
acknowledge that (1) the knowledge and expertise of the TCC is beneficial
to both parties, (2) the joint nature of the claims against RDS and SPDC can
provide the plaintiffs a positive, fair, and reasonable outcome because
SPDC's jurisdiction hinges on RDS' claim,'25 and (3) finding jurisdiction in
this claim is reasonable, not oppressive to the defendant, and it promotes
some socially desirable objective.'26
118. See id [751 (concluding that whether SPDC and RDS are separate entities does
not preclude the Okpabi claimants).
119. See id. [113]-[15]; see also Caparo Indus. Plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL)
633 (appeal taken from Eng.).
120. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962).
121. McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 431 (appeal taken from Eng.).
122. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [113]-[15].
123. See id.; Roorda, supra note 8 (deducing that the less involved the parent
companies are with health, safety, and environmental policies with their subsidiaries, the
further they are from liability).
124. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
125. See Okpabi [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, [89] (lamenting that the judge himself
referred to the financial standing and positions of the claimants and the defendants;
noting that the former was poor and the latter were rich but failed to adequately weigh
these in considering fairness and justice); Roorda, supra note 8 (stating that the suit can
only proceed against SPDC, because it is anchored if there is a claim for RDS).
126. See also McLoughlin [1983] 1 AC 410 (HL) 431.
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Furthermore, access to justice should play a role in accessing jurisdiction,
as it pertains to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'27 On
appeal, the court should consider whether legal aid, such as financial
assistance, would be available to the plaintiffs in their home forum, i.e.,
Nigeria.'2 8 The availability of legal aid and an access to justice is dependent
on a number of factors, such as whether costs are high, whether the time
between commencement of the claim and a ruling is reasonable, and whether
there are extenuating, unusual, or other relevant circumstances to account
for. 129
Expanding adjudicatory authority beyond duty of care to include personal
jurisdiction highlights the flexibility of the U.S. specific personal jurisdiction
principles, which can be applied in the TCC. 3 0 Just as these principles
protect the U.S. constitutional right to due process, when these principles are
applied within the context of Nigerian oil and gas cases, it can likewise
further important principles enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution; dignity
for the human person and the right to a fair hearing.'3 1 Thus, using a specific
jurisdiction analysis allows the court to weigh factors such as the defendant's
due process interests and the plaintiffs interest in swift adjudication; the
public policy implications of extending judicial authority over foreign
corporations; and the state's interest in providing a forum for citizens to seek
redress for their injuries. 132 In doing so, these factors and considerations
127. See, e.g., Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. Plc [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975, [94] (stating
that access to justice in Zambia was almost impossible).
128. See Connelly v. R.T.Z. Corp. Plc [1997] UKHL 30, [30] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (noting that the availability of financial assistance in the United Kingdom, coupled
with the non-availability in the appropriate forum (which was Namibia) was
"exceptionally... a relevant factor.").
129. See Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975, [169]-[198] (analyzing whether the
claimants had access to justice in their home forum of Zambia); see also Hakeem Ijaiya
& O.T. Joseph, Rethinking Environmental Law Enforcement in Nigeria, 5 BEIJING L.
REV. 306, 315 (2014) (describing that corruption, bad governance, and poor enforcement
mechanisms can also be considered during inquiries about access to justice).
130. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924
(2011); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
131. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §§ 34, 36.
132. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 80-81 (2010); see also Anderson, supra note 56, at 337; Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly
Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 635 (2009) (noting that a court
should look at he following three things: (1) whether the cause of action ."arises out of
.' the defendant's contact with the forum," (2) whether the "defendant purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of the forum," and (3) whether "granting jurisdiction
comports with 'fair play and substantial justice."'); William H. Richman, Understanding
Personal Jurisdiction, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 599, 610-611 (1992) (critiquing the Supreme
Court's inconsistent use of additional interests in justifying its exercise of specific
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allow for a rich and robust inquiry into each individual case, thus providing
legal stability and reliability in Nigerian oil and gas disputes.
IV. PERFORMING WORK-OVERS: FEASIBLE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE
A. Create Long Arm Statutes and Federal Legislation to Govern Oil
and Gas Cases
Moving forward, to resolve oil and gas disputes at home, Nigeria should
create a consistent framework for approaching jurisdiction issues in oil and
gas cases through passing long arm statutes. Long arm statutes allow local
courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations whose actions have
caused injury to the plaintiff.'3 3 In the U.S. these statutes grant authority to
a state court to make a defendant corporation amenable to suit in that forum,
so long as the basic principles of minimum contacts and fairness are balanced
and satisfied.13 4
Similarly, Nigeria could create long arm statutes that would guarantee the
courts the power to establish jurisdiction over foreign corporations. These
statutes could potentially be effective in the Niger Delta states where many
of the lawsuits originate because foreign oil companies could be hauled into
court in the local courts. Furthermore, they can grant those states personal
jurisdiction over RDS and other oil companies based on the subsidiary's
exploration, drilling, and other related activities within the state.'35
Additionally, due to the Nigerian economy's inherent dependence on oil
and gas, a federal mandate should be established along the lines of
international law. Such a mandate could be constructed like the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA").1 3 6 The FTCA allows private citizens and parties to
sue the U.S. in U.S. federal court for torts committed by an agent of the
U.S.13 7 Since the FTCA grants federal courts jurisdiction over all claims
personal jurisdiction, such as territorial sovereignty, defendant's inconvenience,
jurisdictional surprise, state interest, and necessity).
133. Int'lShoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
134. Id. at 316-17, 323 (noting that a balancing test is necessary when subjecting a
corporate defendant to another forum; the factors to consider are the undue burden to the
defendant to litigate in an inconvenient forum and the interest of the state in protecting
its citizens).
135. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (holding that Massachusetts, via
a long arm statute, may exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania resident from an
accident that occurred on a Massachusetts highway because the defendant consented to
jurisdiction by merely driving on a Massachusetts tate highway); see, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (2017); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302
(McKinney 2018).
136. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2012).
137. See id. §§ 1346(b), 2674.
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brought under that statute, a Nigerian version of such an act would
automatically grant the federal courts jurisdiction over claims against oil and
gas companies, but apply the local law of the jurisdiction where the act
occurred.138 Such a statute could be beneficial for Nigeria because it would
create more uniform application of the law and forge partnerships among the
two levels of government who would resolve these disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Okpabi court took a very limiting and conservative view of
the meaning of operations to prevent the case from being heard by the TCC.
Such an approach has potentially harmful business implications because
parent corporations are now be incentivized to be less involved with the
"direct operations" or actions of their subsidiaries, absolving them of
answering to future liability claims. Going forward, this could deny injured
plaintiffs the chance to receive adequate and just compensation for their
injuries. Creating a legal framework for determining personal jurisdiction in
Nigeria would provide a richer and more robust exploration of the merits of
these oil and gas cases, thus moving away from the current duty of care
framework. If the TCC decided Okpabi through a personal jurisdiction
analysis, the TCC would likely have jurisdiction to hear the case and,
potentially, provide the Bille and Ogale communities some relief.
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